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Knowledge of speech, but not of silence; 
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word. 
- T. S. Eliot1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he fate of great words,” in their constant wandering, “appears to 
be their progressive dispersion in different directions, so that, in the end, 
neither detractors nor epigones know exactly what they are referring to in 
their diatribes or panegyrics.”2 
In examining the changing dynamic of the religious phenomenon in 
postmodern societies, legal studies have invented or imported a 
considerable number of terms that offer only the illusion of scientific 
precision. Grand words that inspire immediate acceptance and a sense of 
security include the following: equality, nondiscrimination, liberty, and 
secularism. However, after this gratifying first impression, the jurist will 
take it upon himself to engage in a closer study to assess the scope, the 
ultimate implications, and the specific ramifications that such terms 
entail in reality. And in doing so, unsurprisingly, both “detractors [and] 
epigones” can lose sight of the underlying meaning, which is ultimately 
adapted to the claims and propositions being debated. 
Neutrality faces this same danger of turning into an “empty” 
signifier, or, alternatively, a word too “full” of meanings. For this reason, 
embarking on an analysis of the concept in relation to religion is a 
worthwhile endeavor. To do so, this Article proposes two explorations—
one in the world of political science and law and another in the world of 
law—of western legal texts from a wide range of traditions, combining 
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 1.  T.S. ELIOT, Choruses from the Rock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962, at 147 (1963). 
 2. Rafael Navarro-Valls, Volver a Pensar la Laicidad, 0 ILU. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS DE LAS 
RELIGIONES  157, 157 (1995), available at http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/revistas/ccr/ 
11354712/articulos/ILUR9595110157A.PDF. 
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an appraisal of case law and academic theory. At the same time, through 
these varied explorations, this Article will attempt to elucidate the 
specific function—if one exists—of neutrality in the complex system of 
state relations with religious beliefs. This will allow for a reflection on 
the scope of neutrality, a concept that, as will be shown, has something in 
it of myth as well as being a principle of state action in relation to the 
religious factor. 
To this end, Part II analyzes the emerging role of the term 
“neutrality” in legal studies by taking a comparative approach to state 
law on religious affairs. Part III addresses the use of the term “neutrality” 
in the law, beginning with a general approach to the original meaning of 
the term in international law. Part IV briefly explains the influence of 
liberal ideology in crafting the meaning of legal neutrality in dealing 
with religion or beliefs. Part V tries to elucidate the meaning of neutrality 
as a principle in the law of several countries. Part VI will focus on the 
role of neutrality in academics. The Article concludes with remarks 
concerning the meaning of neutrality, its role as a legal principle, and its 
mythical character. 
II. NEUTRALITY AS AN EMERGING TERM IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
STATE AND RELIGION 
To introduce the topic, a very general definition of the concept of 
neutrality is needed. Neutrality designates the quality or attitude of one 
who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict. In the legal world, as 
will be shown, the concept of neutrality made its first appearance in 
international law.3 
Neutrality appears in state law on religious affairs to the extent that 
the recognition of the fundamental right of religious freedom appears to 
entail an obligation on the state that may be specifically defined as 
“neutrality.”4 The religious neutrality of the state is asserted in this sense 
in numerous geo-legal contexts. Merely by way of example, this 
religious neutrality appears in decisions by the Italian Constitutional 
Court,5 the Spanish Constitutional Court,6 the German Federal 
 
 3. See infra Part III.  
 4. “[Article] 9 of the Convention . . . guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, including the freedom not to belong to a religion, and . . . imposes on Contracting States a 
‘duty of neutrality and impartiality.’” Lautsi v. Italy, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30814/06, ¶ 60, 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/ lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf.  
 5. See Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235, (It.), http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ 
actionPronuncia.do (search for case number 235 for year 1997). 
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Constitutional Court,7 the U.S. Supreme Court,8 and the European Court 
of Human Rights.9 Moreover, its importance is asserted as an obligation 
upon state authorities and officials,10 and it is stressed as a “basic value” 
in the minimum international criteria for religious freedom.11 
Religious neutrality appears together with other terms such as 
impartiality, separation, independence, and autonomy. The question that 
arises is whether it is really necessary to introduce so many concepts, 
including the notion of religious neutrality, given that its implications are 
already stipulated in the principles of religious equality and secularism. 
Might it simply be a new way of referring to established categories, an 
old wine in new wineskins?12 It certainly might seem this way at first 
glance; nevertheless, various reasons illustrate the value of making use of 
the concept of neutrality as an advantageous alternative. A few of these 
reasons are considered below. 
The first is the justification that might be called the “language 
barrier.”13 The Western legal worlds—basically the Anglo-American 
 
 6. See S.T.C., June 2, 2004 (No. 101) (Spain), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ 
en/jurisprudencia/Pages/Sentencia.aspx?cod=8300 (“In its objective dimension, religious freedom 
entails a twofold demand, referred to in art. 16.3 CE: first, the neutrality of public authorities, 
inherent to the non-confessionalism of the State; second, the maintenance of relations of cooperation 
between public authorities and the various churches. In this regard, we previously stated in STC 
46/2001, February 15, FJ 4, that ‘art. 16.3 of the Constitution, after setting forth a declaration of 
neutrality (STC 340/1993, November 16, and 177/1996, of November 11), considers the religious 
component perceptible in Spanish society and orders the public authorities to maintain “the 
consequent relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations”, thereby 
introducing a notion of non-confessionalism or positive secularism that “prohibits any kind of 
confusion between religious and State functions” (STC 177/1996, November 11).’”). 
 7. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, 2 
BvR 1436/02 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
rs20030924_2bvr143602en.html; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] June 26, 2002, 1 BvR 670/91 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/ 
entscheidungen/rs20020626_ 1bvr067091en.html.  
 8. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).  
 9. See Hasan v. Bulgaria, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55 (2000); Manoussakis v. Greece, 23 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 387 (1996); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 397 (1993). 
 10. Eur. Consult. Ass., Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, Res. 1743 ¶ 16 (2010), 
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedTExt/ 
ta10/ERES1743.htm. 
 11. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] & The Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR] Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief, Sept. 28, 
2004, at 11, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/13993. 
 12. Robert E. Goodin & Andrew Reeve, Liberalism and Neutrality, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY  
1 (Robert E. Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989). 
 13. The “language barrier” is a common difficulty in dealing with comparative law that 
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tradition and the Continental European tradition—are moving ever closer 
together as a result of the constitutional demands imposed by human 
rights and the interdependence arising from globalization.14 “[T]he 
techniques and mechanisms of law are often very different from one 
country to the next, but . . . the actual solutions, the responses to problems, 
and the legal sensibility are more or less the same.”15 However, language 
can throw up barriers that prevent or hinder the analysis of common 
problems and solutions. An example of this issue is the word laicidad, a 
Spanish word that does not exist in the English language. Its near-
equivalent would be the term “secularism,” but secularism does not relate 
exactly to the principle of laicidad, but to laicism as an ideological 
choice.16 The French word laïcité has no exact translation, and when 
employed in English directly evokes the French system of relations 
between the state and religions.17 On the other hand, the word “neutrality” 
is a term used by English speakers in a sense to identify the principle of 
laicidad.18 If the same word existed in Romance and Germanic languages, 
this equivalence would offer clear advantages for a joint study of 
approaches to the religious factor in different legal traditions. 
The second justification, more complex than the first, relates to the 
semantic deflation suffered by the term laicidad. A balanced approach to 
the concept of laicidad requires a certain degree of caution. Friedrich von 
Hayek pointed out the perversion of language in what he referred to as 
 
academics often reference. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY AND RESEARCH 142 (1971); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK 
COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (2009); W. Cole Durham, Jr., Foreword: Comparative Law in the Late 
Twentieth Century, 1987 BYU L. REV. 325, 327. 
 14. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).  
 15. JEAN CARBONNIER, DERECHO FLEXIBLE 197 (1974). 
 16. See Iain T. Benson, Considering Secularism, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN A SECULAR 
SOCIETY 83–98 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004). 
 17. See, e.g., OLIVIER ROY, SECULARISM CONFRONTS ISLAM xii (George Holoch trans., 
2007); Lorenzo Zucca, The Crisis of the Secular State—A reply to Professor Sajó, 7 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 494 (2009). 
 18. “Governmental religious neutrality is attained when government does not influence its 
citizens’ choices for or against certain religious or secular systems of belief, either by imposing 
burdens on them or by granting advantages to them. Instead, government is neutral when it is 
evenhanded toward people of all faiths and of none.” John T.S. Madeley, European Liberal 
Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality, in CHURCH AND STATE IN 
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: THE CHIMERA OF NEUTRALITY 7 (John T.S. Madeley & Zsolt Enyedi 
eds., 2003) (quoting STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF 
PLURALISM 10 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“weasel words,”19 a phrase inspired by an old Norse myth that attributes 
to the weasel an ability to suck out the contents of an egg without 
breaking its shell. Hayek noted the possibility of emptying words of their 
content, or of stripping them of their meaning, so that only the signifier 
remains.20 This is similar to what has happened to the word laicidad.21 
The reasons for this perversion are explained below. 
In France, for example, there have been attempts to clarify the 
terminology, resulting in the use of laïcité du combat22 to designate the 
outdated, intolerant French secularism,23 as opposed to laïcité ouverte,24 
which is what is sought in France today,25 and on which the Canadian 
system is predicated.26 Turkey, meanwhile, would define a form of 
laicidad that acts as a breakwater against the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism.27 In Italy, faced with the difficulty of applying an old-
fashioned French-style laicidad, in academic circles it has been deemed 
necessary to undertake the task of ripensare la laicità.28 In short, in light 
of this polysemy and its concomitant political confusion, it has been 
suggested that laicidad might simply end up becoming a “useless legal 
concept.”29 
 
 19. THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 221 (Edward Feser ed., 2006). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Luis Prieto Sanchís, Religión y Política (A Propósito del Estado Laico), 53 PERSONA Y 
DERECHO 113, 115 (2005). 
 22. Laïcité du combat means an aggressive or hostile detachment of the State from religion or 
beliefs, particularly from institutional religion and more specifically from the Catholic Church. 
 23.  Martin Rhonheimer, Democrazia Moderna, Stato Laico e Missione Spirituale della 
Chiesa: Spunti per una Concezione Politica “Sana della Laicità”, in LAICITÀ: LA RICERCA 
DELL’UNIVERSALE NELLE DIFFERENZE 101 (Pierpaolo Donati ed., 2008).  
 24. Fernando Rey, La Laicidad ‘A la Francesa’, ¿Modelo o Excepción?, 53 PERSONA Y 
DERECHO 385, 395 (2005). Laïcité ouverte means a separation between church and state which 
admits some kind of relation between institutional religion or belief and the state, or recognizes a 
role of religion in public life, in the daily life of a given country, in its traditions, etc. 
 25. Miguel Angel Jusdado, El Sentido Moderno del Laicismo Francés, 104 NUEVA REVISTA 
DE POLÍTICA, CULTURA Y ARTE  66 (Marzo–Abril 2006). 
 26. Gérard Bouchard & Charles Taylor, Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques 
d’Accommodement Reliées aux Différences Culturelles, BUILDING THE FUTURE : FINAL REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION, 2008, available at http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/ index-en.html.; María 
Elósegui Itxaso, El Concepto De Laicidad Abierta En El Informe Bouchard-Taylor Para Québec, 23 
REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO CANÓNICO Y DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO (2010). 
 27. Rey, supra note 24, at 403. 
 28. See RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS, Los Estados Frente a la Iglesia, 9 ANUARIO DE DERECHO 
ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 17, 29–34 (1993). Ripensare la laicità might mean a proposal of an 
academic legal debate for revisiting the real meaning and practical effect of laicism in our welfare 
states and in our postmodern, pluralistic societies. 
 29. Giuseppe Dalla Torre, Laicità: Un Concetto Giuridicamente Inutile, 53 PERSONA Y 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013  3:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
662 
Turning to another very different perspective, represented in the 
concept referred to as laicidad positiva, the matter is no clearer. The 
concept of laicidad positiva was employed by Pope Benedict XVI, when 
he asserted in a letter to Senator Marcello Pera (taking up, in part, the 
terminology of Pius XII) that “a healthy laical State should also logically 
leave room in its legislation for this fundamental dimension of the human 
soul. This is, in fact, a ‘laicidad positiva,’ guaranteeing each citizen the 
right to live his own religious faith with genuine freedom, including in 
the public sphere.”30 This same notion of laicidad positiva was also 
employed by the former Spanish congressman Victorino Mayoral in a 
newspaper article31 and in the Manifiesto en Defensa de una Sociedad 
Laica of the Fundación Cives (a Spanish secularist organization), which 
asserted: “The laicidad positiva of the State, recognized in Article 16.3, 
is presented in this context as the guarantee of freedom of conscience for 
all, of the equality of all before the law, of non-discrimination for 
religious reasons and of the neutrality of the State in relation to the 
religious and moral beliefs of its citizens.”32 It is highly probable that 
neither Benedict XVI nor Mayoral and the Fundación Cives meant 
exactly the same thing when employing this term. 
Following Dalla Torre, it is apparent that there are various ways of 
approaching the concept of laicidad, some of which are even mutually 
incompatible.33 In some cases, laicidad is equivalent to secularism, a 
position that is not so much legal as it is ideological. Secularism is 
conceived of as a confrontation between religion (a kind of fable, myth, 
or superstition) and reason (as represented by empirical science and 
technology with its unyielding advancements and benefits to humanity); 
between dogma (whose formulations are indisputable and unchangeable) 
and relativism; or even between traditionalism and innovation. Another 
means of approaching laicidad is to view it as an equivalent of non-
confessionalism, in the sense that it refers to the state having no official 
religion under its protection. Equally easy to assimilate into the concept 
 
DERECHO 139 (2005).  
 30. Letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Senator Marcello Pera, Presidente Honorario de la 
Fundación Magna Carta on the Norcia Conference “Libertad y Laicidad,” (Oct. 15, 2005), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2005/documents/ hf_ben-
xvi_let_20051015_senatore-pera_it.html. 
 31. Vitorino Mayoral, Religión o Política, EL PERIÓDICO (EXTREMADURA), Mar. 21, 2007,   
available at http://www.elperiodicoextremadura.com/noticias/noticia.asp?pkid= 292556. 
 32. Manifiesto en defensa de una sociedad laica, FUNDACION CIVES, 
http://www.fundacioncives.org/index.php?id=121 (last visited Aug. 27, 2011).  
 33. Dalla Torre, supra note 29, at 142–45. 
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of laicidad is that of a state rejecting submission to laws foreign to it, 
such as human rights, or spurning laws above it, such as natural law. 
Under this formulation, a kind of ethical positivism gives rise to the 
ethical state—more or less totalitarian, a producer of social values that 
must be shared. 
In light of so many possible definitions, it is reasonable to conclude 
that “laicidad as such, as a valid universal concept, does not exist, and its 
meaning and, therefore, its consequences will be different depending 
even on the political party holding government power at any given 
moment.”34 
Considering the factors discussed above, would it not be an 
appealing alternative to adopt the concept of religious neutrality? There 
are reasons for responding to this question in both the affirmative and the 
negative. Before answering either way, a few preliminary reflections are 
needed. 
III. NEUTRALITY AND LAW 
As mentioned above, neutrality generally designates the quality or 
attitude of one who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict. A 
closer examination reveals two modes of expressing neutrality, under 
which practically all others can be classified. The first of these relates to 
the attitude or intellectual position of political authorities; a distinction is 
made here between negative or indifferent neutrality and positive or 
active neutrality. The second mode of expression relates, in a sense, to 
equality of treatment: here, there is a distinction between neutrality of 
purpose, which is impartiality with regard to specific factors or qualities 
in decision making, and neutrality of outcome, which is guaranteeing that 
neutral decision making does not produce unequal results because of 
those factors or qualities.35 
As noted earlier, in legal terms neutrality first emerged as a concept 
in international law. Legal dictionaries and encyclopedias usually restrict 
the concept of neutrality to the field of conflicts between states. Thus, 
 
 34. Isidoro Martín Sánchez & Gloria Moreno Botella, Laicidad y Enseñanza: Problemas 
Actuales, in SECULARIZACIÓN Y LAICIDAD EN LA EXPERIENCIA DEMOCRÁTICA MODERNA: 
JORNADAS DE ESTUDIO, OÑATI 239 (Juan Goti Ordeñana, San Sebastián, & Librería Carmelo eds., 
1996). 
 35. Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Para una Interpretación Laica de la Constitución, in ESTADO Y 
RELIGIÓN, IN LA EUROPA DEL SIGLO XXI: ACTAS DE LAS XIII JORNADAS DE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE 
LETRADOS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 147, 167 (Centro de Estudios Políticos y 
Constitucionales & Tribunal Constitucional eds., 2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013  3:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
664 
neutrality is “[t]he state of a nation which takes no part between two or 
more other nations at war,”36 which implies at least some degree of 
“abstention” and “impartiality,”37 referring mainly to a series of rules 
governing relations between belligerent states and neutral states (those 
not involved in the conflict). These rules belong to that particular sort of 
international law that is traditionally called “law of war.” But it is 
noteworthy that in times closer to the present the term “neutrality” has 
been used in different and more blurred contexts, where it is less 
connected, or at least diminished in its characteristic connection, with the 
international law of war. In this sense we speak of “permanent 
neutrality” of states, territories, or areas, although the concept is more 
often designated by the term “neutralization.” In this sense, the condition 
of neutrality does not arise merely as certain conflicts arise, but covers 
any possible future conflict. In addition, permanent neutrality and the 
legal status of its effects may be spoken of even in times of peace.38 
In principle, neutrality refers to a position that a state voluntarily 
decides to adopt in response to a conflict arising between other sovereign 
entities that are its equals.39 In the neutrality of international law, 
significant consequences can be identified for relations between the state 
and religion. First of all, neutrality in international law implies the 
existence of a conflict. But relations between religious groups in a 
country do not necessarily need to be conflictive unless we intentionally 
consider them as such. 
[T]here is no confrontation or conflict here; there are only people 
engaged in the task of their own realization as such. And on that task the 
State is not called upon to make pronouncements, but to make it 
possible . . . by removing obstacles, eliminating coercion and 
guaranteeing its achievement within the scope of its powers.40 
Nor is there any reason that relations between religions and the state 
should be conflicting. In this respect, a position which holds that 
religious movements—the “strong religions”41—are seeking to seize 
 
 36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONUNCIATIONS (Henry C. Black et al. eds., 6th ed. 
1991).  
 37. Alejandro Herrero Rubio, Neutralidad, in NUEVA ENCICLOPEDIA JURÍDICA 330 
(Francisco Seix ed., 1982). 
 38. Luigi Sico, Neutralità, in 28 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 164, 164–65 (1978). 
 39. Manuel Ossorio et al., Neutralidad, in DICCIONARIO DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS POLÍTICAS 
Y SOCIALES 644 (28th ed. 2001). 
 40. Ángel Marzoa, No Confesionalidad e Indeferentismo en Materia Religiosa (Dos 
Términos no Implicados), 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 103, 106 (1989). 
 41. András Sajó, Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason, 30 
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power cannot be said to be entirely neutral. In these cases, the state is not 
a third neutral party but is merely another party to the conflict and must 
defend itself. 
Secondly, the concept of neutrality in this area appears to be broader 
than what can be inferred from mere abstention. In principle, the 
neutrality of a state in a military conflict between two other states means 
that it will keep out of the conflict, neither providing assistance to nor 
impeding the action of either side. More specifically, it is understood that 
a primary duty of the neutral state consists of not providing the 
adversaries with any material that could be used to pursue their 
hostilities.42 However, total inaction—neutrality of impact43—is not the 
only form of neutrality.44 A state could be equally neutral by doing all 
possible to assist or impede both sides in the conflict to an equal 
degree.45 At this point, the classical considerations related to the 
principle of equality come into play with all their intensity. Does 
neutrality require that trade relations with the parties to the conflict be 
quantitatively equal? If one of the adversaries is a country with a 
population of one million, while the other is a country of fifteen million, 
would neutrality be understood to mean providing each country with one 
ton of food, regardless of their differing demographics? A real example 
of neutrality in war may serve to illustrate the point: can a consistently 
neutral state, such as Switzerland, provide medicine to the injured and/or 
sick of a country at war? If it does, should it provide the same aid to the 
country on the other side of the conflict? If it fails to do so, does it 
abandon its neutrality?46 
Now let us turn to the legal relations of the state with religion. In this 
context, it is virtually impossible to sustain “first generation” 
neutrality—hands-off neutrality47 or negative neutrality48—and much 
 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2401, 2402 (2009). 
 42. James Upcher, Neutrality, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 832 (Peter Cane & 
Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008), available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/ 
views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t287.e1527 (subscription required). 
 43. Alexa Zellentin, Neutrality as a Twofold Concept, 4 LES ATELIERS DE L’ETHIQUE 159, 
162–166 (2009), available at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/IMG/ pdf_13_Zellentin.pdf. 
 44. Peter Jones, The Ideal of the Neutral State, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 9, 18 (Robert E. 
Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989). 
 45. See Alan Montefiore, Preliminaries, in NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY: THE 
UNIVERSITY AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT 5 (Alan Montefiore ed., 1975).  
 46. See RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 63 
(1996).  
 47. Zellentin, supra note 43, at 160. 
 48. See Jones, supra note 44, at 18.  
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less a neutrality of total indifference or distance, given the involvement 
of and active role played by the interventionist state.49 
“Negative” neutrality is far from being the only form in which the 
phenomenon presents itself. A clear and unadulterated “take” on the 
delimitation of the principle of neutrality would perhaps be just as 
desirable as it is difficult to apply.50 This is because neutrality of inaction 
has been overtaken by other forms of neutrality that are just as prevalent. 
To illustrate the “advance” or reformulation of neutrality, reference is 
often made to the role of the referee in a sports match or the judge in a 
criminal proceeding.51 A neutral referee is not exactly a person who 
remains completely out of the game; the referee fulfills a specific role 
within it, the role of interpreting and applying the rules of the game. The 
neutral referee applies the rules impartially, without applying greater 
severity to one team over the other, helping or hindering both sides 
equally. However, the rules that the referee makes use of have not been 
created to prevent any kind of inequality, but only certain practices that 
are deemed contrary to fair play. On this point, there is a certain parallel 
with the activity of the state, which intervenes as a referee in the specific 
legal terrain occupied by religious bodies in the different European 
nations.52 Nevertheless, the neutral referee does not create the rules or 
set the limits; he simply applies the rules created by others. 
Apart from the figure of the referee, the image of the neutral judge in 
a criminal proceeding has also been employed. This analogy is applied in 
order to emphasize that the chances of the accused being convicted or 
 
 49. See THIEMANN, supra note 46, at 63–64.  
 50. “Neutrality (or non-confessionalism, or secularism, or whatever you wish to call it) is 
either strictly applied or is not true neutrality, but favoring of one, another or several religious 
options, always to the detriment of others, especially those at odds with the positive or widely 
accepted religions. The alternative between neutrality and confusion is thus just as unbalanced as its 
correlate between conflict and collaboration.” Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, La Neutralidad, por Activa y 
por Pasiva, in LAICISMO Y CONSTITUCIÓN 161–62 (María Isabel de la Iglesia ed., 2009).  
 51. Jones, supra note 44, at 19–20; Marzoa, supra note 40, at 106.  
 52. For instance, Silvio Ferrari has remarked: 
This common European model appears to be defined by the following coordinates: a) The 
state is neutral (impartial) towards the various individual religious subjects. b) A religious 
sub-sector is singled out within the public sector. This may be understood as a “playing 
field” or “protected area.” Inside it the various collective religious subjects (churches, 
denominations and religious communities) are free to act in conditions of substantial 
advantage compared to those collective subjects that are not religious. c) The state has the 
right to intervene in this area only to see that the players respect the rules of the game and 
the boundaries of the playing field. 
Silvio Ferrari, The New Wine and the Old Cask. Tolerance, Religion and the Law in 
Contemporary Europe, 10 RATIO JURIS 75, 77–78 (1997) (citations omitted).  
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absolved do not depend—must not depend—on factors such as race, 
creed, sex, or ideology. Here, once again, neutrality is not a matter of 
indifference. It requires the positive intervention of the judge to purge the 
process of any prejudice, thereby “neutralizing” any influence in the 
result that might otherwise be imposed by a range of external factors, 
which are closely related to the suspect classes that we refer to in 
constitutional law. 
Both the referee of the match and the judge of the criminal 
proceeding reveal once again that the neutrality of indifference, of total 
abstention, is not viable because of the very features that frame the 
dynamic of the religious factor in a social and democratic state of law. In 
other words, alongside negative neutrality exists a positive neutrality that 
requires a certain degree of involvement of the state in the hypothetical 
social confrontation. 
IV. NEUTRALITY AND IDEOLOGICAL LIBERALISM 
The emergence of the principle of neutrality as a requirement of state 
action was a product of ideological liberalism. Defining liberalism 
proves to be an almost impossible task as this movement has developed 
over a long period of time in the West and has many variants. Some of its 
more consistent features are the defense of individualism and democracy, 
the insistence on limitations on the power of the state, the social contract 
theory, capitalism as an economic system, and freedom understood as 
individual autonomy.53 
From the outset, liberal philosophers themselves have been aware of 
the controversial and difficult nature of the term neutrality: “[T]he term 
neutrality is unfortunate; some of its connotations are highly misleading, 
others suggest altogether impracticable principles.”54 Neutrality as a 
liberal category is found in the work of the so-called neoliberals of the 
twentieth century55 and, more specifically, of thinkers such as John 
Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman.56 
 
 53. Nicola Matteucci, Liberalismo, in 2 DICCIONARIO DE POLÍTICA 875, 875–897 (Norberto 
Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci, & Gianfranco Pasquino eds., 1991). 
 54. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 191 (2005).  
 55.  MARIANO FAZIO, HISTORIA DE LAS IDEAS CONTEMPORÁNEAS: UNA LECTURA DEL 
PROCESO DE SECULARIZACIÓN 183–188 (2006). 
 56. “[A] state or government . . . must be neutral between its citizens.” ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974). “No reason is a good reason if it requires the power 
holder to assert: (a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by his fellow citizens, 
or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his 
fellow citizens.” BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1981).  
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013  3:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
668 
Although there are certain observable differences in the thinking of these 
authors,57 the common feature is the description of the liberal and neutral 
state as one that does not impose a conception of good or of the good life 
upon its citizens, but that allows them to follow their own conception of 
good in their own way.58 The state, then, is neutral insofar as it does not 
interfere in the individual conceptions of the good life, however lofty or 
modest they may be. This attitude of noninterference is generally 
described as Dworkin explains it: each person follows a more or less 
complex conception of what gives life meaning. The academic researcher 
who values the contemplative life has a conception of life meaning, just 
as the citizen who watches a lot of television, drinks a lot of beer, and 
says, “This is the life!” as he sits back in his armchair, even if he fails to 
defend his thinking in the sophisticated manner of the academic 
researcher.59 In any case, the state maintains its hands-off approach with 
regard to the different methods of configuring the good life, including the 
religious method. Dworkin goes so far as to argue that these are areas of 
human life that are duly protected by the rights to freedom. What is 
curious is that contemporary states—perhaps with the occasional 
exception—are more inclined to subsidize and support research, 
literature, or music than beer-drinking contests or world records for the 
longest time spent in front of a television. This type of contemporary 
state would not be neutral. Indeed, from this same perspective, the 
Spanish state itself is not neutral, as its constitution recognizes culture, 
research, the environment, and national heritage as constitutional values 
(Spanish Constitution articles 44 to 46) but states authoritatively that it 
does not grant this status to religion or beliefs.60 
It would certainly be easy from any point of view—including a 
liberal perspective—to confuse noninterference in individuals’ 
conceptions of ethics or the good life with ethical neutrality on the part 
 
 57. Jones, supra note 44, at 10.  
 58. Id. at 11.  
 59. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).  
 60. Dionisio Llamazares Fernández, Libertad de Conciencia y Laicidad en la Constitución 
Española de 1978, in JORNADAS JURÍDICAS SOBRE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA 119–22 (Juan 
Ferreiro Galguera ed., 2008). However, it is rather odd that article 16.3 of the Constitution should 
include the sentence: “The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish 
society . . .” wherein the direct complement is “the religious beliefs” and not “the freedom of 
religion.” LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA Dec. 6, 1978, art. 16. And it is more surprising still to find 
that when the Spanish Constitution mentions culture and research, it does so with a sentence in 
which both constitutional values also appear in the same syntactic position of direct complement, 
with just one tiny and significant difference: the state cannot “promote” religion as such 
(confessionalism, multi-confessionalism, pluri-confessionalism) but merely “take [it] into account.” 
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of the state. But it is undeniable that the state is not ethically neutral from 
the moment that, for example, it establishes a criminal code. It is claimed 
that the state declares and condemns criminal behavior, but that it 
cannot—and must not—declare that there is behavior that is sinful. 
Curiously, crimes and sins coincide in more than a few instances. It is 
also claimed that the strength of the ethics of the state, admitting not only 
the possibility but also the inevitable existence thereof,61 consists of the 
fact that they lack any transcendent association and are held by free, 
autonomous men, as opposed to the heteronomy and slavery of religious 
morality.62 This is nothing less than reductionism because secular 
morality can be followed with the same degree of closed-mindedness as 
religious morality, while religious morality can be experienced with the 
same sense of liberation as secular morality. The question, in my view, is 
not one of patterns of behavior, but of the personality of specific 
individuals. 
The general categorization of liberal neutrality can, in turn, be 
divided into four more specific notions63: rights neutrality, 
epistemological neutrality, political neutrality, and legal neutrality. 
Rights neutrality refers to the demarcation of those areas of human 
experience and activity that fall outside the scope of the state. Such areas 
are not subject to the processes of deliberation or debate, compromise or 
negotiation that make up the political life of a liberal state.64 Meanwhile, 
epistemological neutrality, which is closely related to rights neutrality, 
refers to the acceptable arguments for demarcating the limitations of 
admissible policy. Epistemological neutrality represents the idea that 
liberal theory must be neutral not only in relation to the rights it 
recognizes and protects, or with respect to the structures that it 
recommends for political life, but also in relation to the intellectual 
foundations that underlie those structures and rights. On the other hand, 
political neutrality is concerned with institutional agreements and 
arrangements. It means that the legislative procedures that establish 
public policies must guarantee that political power is sufficiently spread 
out, even, and shared so as to prevent any group from dominating the 
 
 61. Llamazares Fernández, supra note 60, at 134.  
 62.  PIERPAOLO DONATI, LAICITÀ: LA RICERCA DELL’UNIVERSALE NELLE DIFFERENZE 11–
12 (2008). 
 63. ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 72–77 (1993). Other 
distinctions related to neutrality include positive and negative neutrality (as discussed earlier), but 
also neutrality of impact, neutrality as “equality of opportunity” and neutrality of justification, or 
neutrality in the reasons justifying certain political choices. Zellentin, supra note 43, at 165–66.  
 64.  Jones, supra note 44, at 18. 
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political scene and imposing its moral view on society as a whole. 
Finally, legal neutrality refers to judicial processes. In this case, liberal 
political thought would argue that judges cannot reconsider what the 
political process has already resolved. If legislators have promulgated a 
particular law, it must be interpreted and applied neutrally, i.e., 
independently of the influence of any new evaluation of conflicting 
points of view. 
Nevertheless, liberal neutrality is not—nor can it be—a perspective 
that defends the neutrality of, or the absence of values in, legislation in 
relation to all moral values, whatever they may be. Rather, it must be 
acknowledged that neutrality is itself a value, an ethical option, a 
normative position, a perspective on what legislators and officials should 
and should not do, a philosophical-political movement that sustains that 
it is wrong for certain ideas to enter the political sphere,65 and that it is 
right for them to be kept out. “[T]he propositions of authors such as 
Rawls, Dworkin or Kymlicka respond, point for point, to the approach of 
liberal ideologies which . . . are no less comprehensive than the 
metaphysical or religious conceptions they exclude.”66 Liberal neutrality 
does not achieve epistemological neutrality because it cannot subject its 
own suppositions to that same rule of neutrality. In other words, it cannot 
neutrally consider the so-called “primary goods” of health, physical 
integrity, wealth, personal dignity, etc. The notion or conception of the 
liberal good life presupposes an individualist narrative regarding the way 
in which people generate or adopt lifestyles. The emphasis is placed on 
an abstract individual who plans his own life and who chooses what is 
best for him, overlooking at least two issues: first, that the individual 
shapes his worldview and his lifestyle through contact with society, 
which inevitably places spatial-temporal limitations on his abstract 
liberty as true autonomy does not exist; and second, that the structure of 
liberal neutrality itself generates inequality of results, as it makes certain 
lifestyle choices more advantageous than others. Why? There are several 
reasons, the most prominent of which are discussed below. 
First of all, in the system of liberal neutrality individual options that 
are consistent with liberal principles have better chances of thriving than 
lifestyle options opposed to those principles. In other words, in the same 
liberal social and state space, morally non-liberal options coexist (“I 
 
 65. See Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and Moral Neutrality, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 72 
(Robert E. Goodwin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989).  
 66. ALEJANDRO LLANO, EL CARÁCTER RELACIONAL DE LOS VALORES CÍVICOS 38 (2004) 
(translation of quote). 
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believe that there is only one good life and it would be best if everyone 
lived that type of life”) with morally liberal options (“I believe that there 
is no good life that is valid for everyone, and it is best for everyone to 
live the kind of life they consider good”). The second of these options 
has an advantage over the first in the sense that—by pure coincidence—
it happens to be the official view of the state. Consider this comparison: 
it is well known that a confessional state may recognize religious 
freedom on a level playing field, but it is also true that significant state 
confessionalism generates inequalities that may go as far as being 
discriminatory. Similarly, a neutral state generates a supposition that 
favors certain ways of life—those that are liberal. Liberal neutrality is 
more inclined to favor secular or laical world views over religious 
ones.67 
Secondly, it is worth reflecting on some of the implications of 
neutrality from an economic perspective of the “market of ideas and 
beliefs.”68 If a large number of individuals or citizens end up at least 
nominally coinciding in the type of good life they choose, it is more than 
likely that certain disruptions will occur. The effect of an economy of 
scale could make this popular choice “cheaper” or more accessible, and 
this easier access might make it more appealing to the masses. 
Conversely, a less popular form of good life would prove less accessible, 
more “expensive” to pursue. On the other hand, the “suppliers” of more 
popular good life options may “raise” the cost of achieving the goal of 
consumer satisfaction. As a result, in either case, the pursuit of certain 
good life options would be more difficult than the pursuit of others. And 
then there is the question of whether certain good life options produce a 
greater level of satisfaction than others in the citizen or individual, which 
require a greater “investment” to achieve the same degree of satisfaction. 
By way of example: the good life of the contemplative monk is cheaper 
in economic terms than the good life of the collector of the works of 
Diego Velázquez. This may even be true not only for the question of 
choice in general, but to the actual specific enjoyment of fundamental 
rights. Thus, for example, freedom of education may be satisfied more 
cheaply in the case of parents who choose state-run schools than those 
who choose alternative private schools. However, curiously, for the 
Spanish Constitutional Court there is no appreciable difference: freedom 
of education consists basically in the freedom of choice, regardless of 
 
 67. See Madeley, supra note 18, at 8.   
 68. See Jones, supra note 44, at 14–18.  
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what the financial cost of that choice might be.69 If in response to this 
inequality of costs, satisfactions, or results the state were to intervene to 
ensure the equal promotion of the different conceptions of good by 
means of positive action, would it be abandoning its position of 
neutrality? For some liberals the answer is yes, because the spheres of 
freedom—immunity from coercion—mark the limits of action for a 
neutral state. This is known as neutrality of purpose. But for others, such 
intervention is not only possible but also forms part of the notion of 
neutrality itself in order to ensure that all conceptions of good are equal. 
This is known as neutrality of outcome. In any case, returning to the 
previous example, it would seem undeniable that if the state finances 
private schools, the lack of neutrality would consist of financing only 
secular private schools and not religious schools.70 
Thirdly, liberal neutrality does not guarantee equal treatment of 
citizens. It does so only when those covered by the principle have 
accepted liberal standards of the good life. But in such cases, neutrality is 
only apparent. In this regard, it is worth recalling that many of the most 
significant religious persecutions of the last two centuries were carried 
out under the pretext of laws that were formally general and neutral.71 
Liberalism has almost imperceptibly introduced the illusion of 
neutral judgment and decisions, i.e., political solutions that are the 
product of a rational process unhindered by any particular world view. 
According to liberalism, we can and must separate religious judgments 
and conclusions from secular ones. And, therefore, secular world views 
are elevated to the level of political and legal regulation simply because 
it is believed that they are of a different nature. Nevertheless,  
 
 69. Constitutional Court Decision 5/1981, February 13: “Also arising from the principle of 
freedom of education is the right of parents to choose whatever religious and moral instruction that 
they may desire for their children (art. 27.3).” (Court Consideration no. 7). “The ideological 
neutrality of teaching in public education institutions regulated under the L.O.E.C.E. imposes an 
obligation upon teachers employed in those institutions to refrain from any form of ideological 
indoctrination, which is the only attitude compatible with the respect for the freedom of the families 
who, by free decision or forced by circumstances, have not chosen education institutions with a 
specific, explicit ideological orientation.” (Court Consideration no. 9) (emphasis added). 
 70. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 200 (1993).  
 71. W. Cole Durham, Perspectives On Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 33 (J.D. van der 
Vyer & John Witte eds., 1996). This may well be the case of article 26 of the 1931 Spanish 
Republican Constitution (“Quedan disueltas aquellas Ordenes religiosas que estatutariamente 
impongan, además de los tres votos canónicos, otro especial de obediencia a autoridad distinta de la 
legítima del Estado”) or even the case of the regulation contested in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah. See 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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[n]either the need to make religious decisions, nor the extreme 
difficulty in doing so, can be avoided. And these decisions, in one 
fashion or another, will have to be enforced, making perfectly clear that 
what we are dealing with is not apples and oranges (secular judgments 
and religious judgments) but apples and apples (secular judgments that 
are at the same time religious).72  
It is not for nothing that when, for example, the principle of neutrality is 
established in German law, it is understood that generic and abstract 
neutrality does not prevent or prohibit the possible coincidence of 
specific moral values in the German body of law with those sustained by 
religious groups.73 This has ultimately led to the postulation of an 
overlapping consensus,74 which may benefit epistemologically75 from 
contributions by citizens with religious beliefs.76 
V. NEUTRALITY AS A PRINCIPLE AND STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS 
Based on the reflections above, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that there is simply no such thing as a neutral state. Neutrality cannot be 
the essence of the state, but rather a requirement for its action in certain 
especially sensitive spheres of societal life. In general, it could be said 
that in relation to religious beliefs 
[t]he neutrality of the secular State applies rules of political justice to 
religion or the religions practiced by the citizens of a given society. 
These rules are based on criteria of freedom, equality and procedural 
fairness. From this political perspective, religion is accepted as part of 
the reality and the cultural heritage of a society or nation and so, 
logically, religious praxis and its facilitation come to form part of the 
 
 72. Douglas Farrow, Three Meanings of Secular, FIRST THINGS, May 2003,  at 22.   
 73. GERHARD ROBBERS, RELIGION AND LAW IN GERMANY 87 (2010).  
 74. “[A] consensus in which it is affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the 
criterion of justice is that political conception itself.” John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1987).  
 75. “The ultimate solution, however, lies in another direction. What is needed is not a 
requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that 
liberalism develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. 
Epistemic diversity, like diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not 
abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice 
but because the speaker has the right to speak.” CARTER, supra note 70, at 230. 
 76. MARTIN RHONHEIMER, CRISTIANISMO Y LAICIDAD: HISTORIA Y ACTUALIDAD DE UNA 
RELACIÓN COMPLEJA 187 (2009). 
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common good.77 
The remainder of this section briefly examines the application of 
neutrality in legal relations between the state and religion in certain legal 
frameworks in the West. 
In the United States, the principle of neutrality as a guideline in state-
religion relations was formulated prior to or simultaneous with the 
generation of the principle in liberal political theory.78 Perhaps the first 
application of the idea of religious neutrality was the case law on intra-
church disputes regarding the assets of a church or the cases involving 
disputes between factions in a religious community. In these cases, rather 
than resolving the conflict based on church doctrine (which would 
require the state somehow to become an “arbitrator of theological 
interpretation”), the principles of the law of the state are asserted—the 
norms of common law—as “neutral” elements for the resolution of the 
conflict.79 
The definition of religious neutrality in U.S. law was formally 
established by Phillip B. Kurland in 1961.80 According to Kurland, the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights81 should 
be interpreted on the basis of a single precept: the state cannot use 
religion as a criterion for action or omission because these clauses, read 
as a whole, forbid both the classification of individuals on the basis of 
their religion and the concession of benefices or offices.82 This formal 
neutrality is appealing for its simplicity and impartiality and is totally 
plausible until, as Douglas Laycock points out, we stop to ponder its 
consequences—some of which produce disconcerting results that are 
firmly counterintuitive.83 Thus, for example, from the “neutral” 
 
 77. Id. at 134. 
 78. A general account of the neutrality principle in state-religion relations may be found in 
W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §§ 2:6, 2:17, 2:93 
(2011). 
 79. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC 
SOCIETY 500–17 (1996); JOSE IGNACIO RUBIO LOPEZ, LA PRIMERA DE LAS LIBERTADES: LA 
LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DURANTE LA CORTE REHNQUIST (1986-2005), at 
166–68 (2006); see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).  
 80. See Phillip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 96 (1961).  
 81. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 82. See Kurland, supra note 80. 
 83. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1000 (1990). 
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application of the National Prohibition Act of 1919 (also known as the 
Volstead Act or the “dry law”)84 would follow the impossibility of 
celebrating a sacrament of the Catholic Church, of certain Protestant 
ceremonies, and of the Jewish Seder. And there are other situations 
where a law fully justified from a secular perspective—and coinciding 
only accidentally with a precept of a specific religion—leads to the 
prohibition of the exercise of some practice of a religious nature.85 
Based on this potential for unwanted results, Laycock himself 
proposes a different form of neutrality, which he calls substantive 
neutrality, according to which the constitutional mandate requires the 
state to act in a way that neither promotes nor dissuades religious or 
nonreligious belief, practice, or observance.86 When neutrality is defined 
this way, some degree of consideration can be given to situations where 
an apparently neutral piece of legislation may harm or benefit a 
particular religion or belief. 
From the distinction between formal and substantial neutrality a 
conclusion may be drawn (recently addressed by a Spanish scholar87) 
which presents a paradox: not every violation of strict neutrality is an 
assault on religious freedom; but, at the same time, not every violation of 
religious freedom is simultaneously an assault on neutrality. But if we 
focus on the actual practice of neutrality, Laycock notes a third 
classification, which he calls disaggregated neutrality, where the 
importance of a particular factor at play takes on a preponderant value in 
decisions that are far from neutral.88 As an example, Laycock refers to 
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Felton.89 This ruling 
invalidates a federal school support program for children with few 
economic resources in religious schools. In itself, the program is neutral, 
as it provides assistance to disadvantaged children (neutrality of 
 
 84. See 41 Stat. 305–23 (1919). 
 85. Waldron, supra note 65, at 40. Similarly, the acknowledgment of Sunday as a day of rest 
conforms to neutral criteria. S.T.C. Feb. 13, 1985, No. 19 (Spain) (Court Consideration 4).  
 86. Laycock, supra note 83, at 1001.  
 87. Zoila Combalía Solís, Relación entre laicidad del Estado y libertad religiosa en la 
jurisprudencia reciente del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 24 REVISTA GENERAL DE 
DERECHO CANÓNICO Y DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 1 (2010). 
 88. For instance, Laycock writes:  
I call this disaggregated neutrality, because it looks only at one side of the balance of 
advancing or inhibiting. Because absolute zero is not achievable, it is always possible to 
find some effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Thus, if you look only at one side of 
the balance, you can always find a constitutional violation. 
Laycock, supra note 83, at 1007. 
 89. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).  
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outcome) regardless of their beliefs (neutrality of purpose). However, the 
Supreme Court viewed the program as contrary to the neutrality of the 
state (formal neutrality prevailing in the case) as it implied a penetrating 
and permanent state presence in the religious school receiving the 
assistance.90 
Incidentally, this argument of “disaggregated neutrality” might also 
be identified in the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, where neutral treatment of the dress of 
university students gave way to a partial view of the problem based on 
the demands arising from the principle of secularism in the Turkish legal 
and social context.91 Thus we have disaggregated neutrality to the extent 
that one of the factors at play, either the promotion of a belief or the 
dissuasion or undermining of a belief, assumes decisive force. These are 
cases where, given that any action or omission of the state necessarily 
has short- or long-term consequences, it appears impossible to achieve 
absolute zero. If the state acts, it is providing support and therefore not 
neutral; but if it does not act, its silence is not neutral either because it is 
interpreted as hostility toward religion. 
We can find this same perception of disaggregated neutrality in the 
case Lautsi v. Italy.92 As Joseph Weiler pointed out in his speech before 
the court on the appeal against the decision of the lower chamber, if the 
crucifix remains, the immediate message sent will be one of state support 
 
 90. The Court stated: 
The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in Lemon and Meek are thus present 
in this case. First, as noted above, the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian 
environment. Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing 
inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message. In short, the scope 
and duration of New York City’s Title I program would require a permanent and 
pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.  
Id. at 412–13 (citations omitted).  
 91. In Sahin, the European Court of Human Rights remarked: 
Having regard to the above background, it is the principle of secularism, as elucidated by 
the Constitutional Court . . . which is the paramount consideration underlying the ban on 
the wearing of religious symbols in universities. In such a context, where the values of 
pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of 
men and women are being taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the 
relevant authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned 
and so consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the 
present case, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn.  
Sahin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 44774/98 (2005). 
 92. Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30814/06 (2009). The case was appealed and decided by 
the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30814/06. According to this latter 
decision displaying crucifixes in Italian public schools classrooms is not contrary to the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
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for a religion, of not being neutral, but ultimately, “[e]ven more alarming 
would be the situation if the crucifixes, always there, suddenly were 
removed.”93 “Make no mistake,” adds the U.S. constitutionalist, “a State-
mandated naked wall, as in France, may suggest to pupils that the State is 
taking an anti-religious attitude. . . . Likewise, a crucifix on the wall may 
be perceived as coercive. Again, it depends on the curriculum to 
contextualize and teach the children in the Italian class tolerance and 
pluralism.”94 
It is, therefore, no surprise that, with a healthy dose of skepticism, 
the concept of neutrality in U.S. law may be classified as a “protean 
concept,” capable of changing form or content.95 Thus we may speak of 
strict neutrality (neutrality of indifference), which is especially reflected 
in the prohibition of state aid to religion, or of nondiscriminatory 
neutrality (close to substantial neutrality), which hints at a degree of 
permeability of the public sphere in relation to religious beliefs, provided 
that the symbols and practices symbolically supported by the state are 
not sectarian or discriminatory. But there is also an argument for the 
possibility of benevolent neutrality.96 This concept aims to broaden the 
framework within which religion might be relevant to include the 
adaptation of the public sphere to religious beliefs.97 This position 
 
 93. Joseph Weiler, Oral Intervention by Professor Weiler on Behalf of Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, and San Marino—States Who Intervene as Third Parties 
in the Lautsi Case Before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 
ILSUSSIDIARIO.NET (June 30, 2010), http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politics-
Society/2010/7/1/EXCLUSIVE-Joseph-Weiler-How-I-defended-the-Crucifix-Before-the-European-
Court-of-Human-Rights/96909/. 
 94. Id. 
 95. THIEMANN, supra note 46, at 60.  
 96. The term is based on the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, where it has been 
employed in decisions related to the application of the clause prohibiting the establishment of an 
official religion. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court, commenting 
on tax exemptions for places of worship said:  
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by 
the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or 
governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed 
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent 
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference.  
Id. at 669; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743–44 (1994) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 
669); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 669). On benevolent neutrality, strict separation and 
the legal restriction, see W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
LAW § 2:6 (2011).  
 97. See DURHAM & SMITH, supra note 96, § 2:6. 
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interprets strict neutrality and the “no aid to religion” policy as hostility 
toward religious beliefs, a policy contrary to the cultural history of the 
United States.98 Benevolent neutrality proscribes only official 
confessionalism or state interference in religion.99 According to this 
position, neutrality means impartiality of the state with regard to all 
religions, but not a distancing from religion.100 
It is worth noting here that the term benevolent neutrality is also 
employed in German law as a concept associated with cooperation.101 
The structure of the German system of relations between the state and 
religion cites neutrality as one of its most important features.102 
Neutrality fulfills some specific roles in the system: guaranteeing 
religious peace, ensuring the free practice of the beliefs of the citizens 
and of religions, and making it possible for each citizen to identify with 
the state as a home for all.103 Neutrality means that the German state 
cannot identify with any church and prohibits the state from any special 
inclination toward a particular religious community by applauding the 
intrinsic value of its ideas or qualities.104 Ideological organizations are 
placed on an equal footing with religious institutions. But at the same 
time, religious organizations cannot be placed by the state in a 
disadvantageous position in relation to other social groups: an 
antireligious policy or state atheism would be contrary to the neutrality 
that characterizes the system. Moreover, neutrality means 
nonintervention, and is intimately associated with the principle of 
autonomy of religious organizations. Finally, it is important to note that 
neutrality in German law also means positive neutrality: the state is 
required to actively promote religion by ensuring the moral “space” that 
religion needs to develop.105 This positive neutrality makes possible—
and at the same time requires—the inclusion of religious needs in urban 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. María Roca, Consideraciones Acerca de la Eventual Personificación Jurídica de la 
Comisión Asesora de Libertad Religiosa, in COMISIÓN ASESORA DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA: 
REALIDAD Y FUTURO 154 (2010).  
 102. ROBBERS, supra note 73, at 86–87. 
 103. This is according to German federal constitutional case law. See Maria Roca, La 
Neutralidad del Estado: Fundamento Doctrinal y Actual Delimitación en la Jurisprudencia, 48 
REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 251, 253–54 (1996). 
 104. ROBBERS, supra note 73, at 86. 
 105. Id. at 87. 
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development law, for example.106 
Turning our attention back from German law to North America, this 
time to Canada, it bears noting that 
[i]nsofar as the requirement of State neutrality is concerned, it is 
necessary because intervention by the State in favor of a given religion 
places an incompatible pressure on the freedom of those who profess a 
less favored religion. Therefore, it is understandable that, in a way, the 
obligation of neutrality arises from the right to free exercise [of 
religion].107 
Furthermore, in cases where there is no explicit establishment of 
neutrality as an objective or structural108 principle—as in the Canadian 
case—the full recognition of freedom of religion requires an attitude of 
the state that, nevertheless, “is not as strict as one founded on an 
autonomous principle of neutrality.”109 In other words, the adaptation or 
accommodation of the religious needs of citizens is more flexible when 
neutrality is a consequence of religious freedom rather than in cases 
where neutrality is established primarily as an objective or structural 
principle. In a way, this assertion is corroborated in the French and 
Turkish cases (although not only in  
 
these cases), as it is shown in a somewhat inadequate regional European 
jurisprudence.110 
Nor has Italian church-state law remained immune from the 
provocative developments regarding state neutrality in relation to the 
religious phenomenon. Indeed, the concept of neutrality appears as a 
requirement imposed on the political sphere because of the principle of 
the secular state; thus, the political sphere must be neutral in the face of 
possible conflicts between religious values and in the performance of 
certain activities (i.e., the broadcasting system or public education 
 
 106. Id. at 82. 
 107. José Woehrling, La Libertad de Religión, el Derecho al Acomodamiento Razonable y la 
Obligación de Neutralidad Religiosa del Estado en el Derecho Canadiense, 33 REVISTA CATALANA 
DE DRET PÚBLIC 1, 3 (2006).  
 108. José María Rodriguez de Santiago, El Estado Aconfesional o Neutro Como Sujeto. un 
modelo Explicativo del Artículo 16.3 CE, in ESTADO Y RELIGIÓN EN LA EUROPA DEL SIGLO XXI: 
ACTAS DE LAS XIII JORNADAS DE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE LETRADOS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 
123 (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales & Tribunal Constitucional eds., 2008). 
 109. Woehrling, supra note 107, at 6. 
 110. Javier Martínez-Torrón, La Cuestión del Velo Islámico en la Jurisprudencia de 
Estrasburgo, 4 DERECHO Y RELIGIÓN 87 (2009).  
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system).111 The neutrality and, associated with it, the impartiality of the 
state toward the religious factor, religious institutions, and symbols, 
would be the “test” —the patent manifestation—of the secularism that 
characterizes its legal system.112 There is also recognition of the link 
existing between the way of interpreting the principle of secularism and 
the ideologically liberal culture, according to which the distinction 
between politics and religion results in two lines of behavior: the 
neutrality of the state toward the various positive expressions of religious 
values, and the application of the principle of equality of treatment and 
nondiscrimination.113 In turn, neutrality is explained or specified in two 
directions: on the one hand, indifference as a reflection of the basic 
principle of the lack of jurisdiction of the contemporary state in religious 
affairs, which prevents it from expressing judgments in religious matters; 
and on the other, nonidentification, based on the idea that the institutions 
through which the state acts must have a character of “generality,” so 
that all citizens—regardless of their beliefs—are able to “recognize 
themselves” in state institutions.114 At the same time, it is argued that 
current circumstances promote an understanding of secularism that is 
more associated with nonidentification than indifference.115 
 
Where does Spanish academic opinion situate the notion of neutrality 
within the dynamic framework of the so-called “guiding principles” of 
church-state law? As a sample, and with no intention of being 
exhaustive, the following will refer to a few contributions that may prove 
significant. 
For one sector of expert opinion, neutrality in religious affairs 
constitutes a terminological quest to replace terms such as secularism or 
non-confessionalism, which allows a more dynamic connectivity 
between the attitude of the state in relation to the religious factor and 
nonreligious world views.116 The result is the adoption of a concept of 
religious and ideological neutrality.117 
 
 111. ENRICO VITALI & ANTONIO G. CHIZZONITI, DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO: MANUALE BREVE: 
TUTTO IL PROGRAMMA DE’ESAME CON DOMANDE E RISPOSTE COMMENTATE 60 (2009). 
 112. MARIA CRISTINA FOLLIERO, DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO: ELEMENTI: PRINCIPI NON SCRITTI, 
PRINCIPI SCRITTI, REGOLE 159 (2007). 
 113. VITALI & CHIZZONITI, supra note 111. 
 114. FOLLIERO, supra note 112. 
 115. VITALI & CHIZZONITI, supra note 111. 
 116. JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, RELIGIÓN, DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD: ANTIGUOS Y NUEVOS 
PLANTEAMIENTOS EN EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 178 (1999). 
 117. Id. at 178–79. 
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At the same time, neutrality establishes an operative bridge between 
non-confessionalism and nondiscrimination: “The neutrality of the State, 
from a functional perspective, has significant consequences for the 
understanding of the principle of equality. In its negative sense, equality 
is equivalent to non-discrimination and, although conceptually diverse, it 
is in a certain sense subsumed in the concept of neutrality.”118 
Other sectors of opinion posit the existence of an implicit obligation 
of ideological neutrality,119 with two dimensions: impartiality of public 
authorities (giving the same treatment to all ideas and beliefs) and state 
abstention from participation in any debate on politics, philosophy, 
morality, aesthetics, etc.120 Neutrality prohibits indoctrination in any 
aspect of society on the part of the state.121 And this extends to various 
aspects of administrative action, from public intervention of the police to 





For another sector, neutrality is a specific mandate derived from 
secularism for the purposes of avoiding discrimination.123 Public 
institutions should be neutral, as should public officials in the 
performance of public duties; it is not for nothing, for example, that the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978 sets forth in its article 103.3 the regulation 
by law of “the guarantees regarding impartiality in the discharge of their 
duties.”124 As a result, religious considerations would not form part of 
the decisive factors that representatives of the state can employ. A 
variant of this same view interprets neutrality as a “component” of 
secularism in evolution, which unites separation and neutrality as 
necessary consequences.125 Again, neutrality requires “the State, the 
public institutions and the holders of public office, regardless of their 
 
 118. Id. at 184. 
 119. This obligation parallels the principle of non-confessionalism in relation to the religious 
factor. 
 120. LUIS MARÍA DÍEZ-PICAZO, SISTEMA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 247 (2d ed. 2005). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Isidoro Martín Sánchez, El Modelo Actual de Relación Entre el Estado y el Factor 
Religioso en España, in JORNADAS JURÍDICAS SOBRE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA 53, 89 (Juan 
Ferreiro Galguera ed., 2008). 
 124. C.E., B.O.E. n. 103, Dec. 6, 1978 (Spain). 
 125. Llamazares Fernández, supra note 60, at 117, 129. 
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own beliefs and convictions, to carry out their duties without any hint of 
discrimination, either positive or negative, toward the citizens as a 
consequence of their beliefs or convictions.”126 In short, neutrality is a 
fundamental element, the functional dimension of secularism, a criterion 
for action of the public authorities, supported by separation as an 
instrumental guarantee.127 
Recalling the connections of the term with international law, another 
sector of Spanish academic opinion associates neutrality, on the one 
hand, with equality, whereby the state must intervene actively in order to 
ensure the exercise of religious freedom.128 Religious assistance in 
prisons or in the army must be provided to all, regardless of creed or 
conviction; if the state acts on this basis, it acts neutrally.129 But on the 
other hand, neutrality is a specific ideological characteristic of public 
educational institutions (as explained by the Spanish Constitutional 
Court130), although this is not so much a consequence of the ideological 
neutrality of the state as such but rather a requirement derived from the 
lack of freedom in education.131 This last point would really require 
further exploration, given its importance. For the moment, this Article 
will contend that neutrality and education are incompatible concepts. 
Education means the transmission of values; wherever values are 
transmitted, neutrality is absent. When a constitutional court applies the 
term “neutrality” to education,132 it does so with the intention of 
 
 126. Id. at 117, 132. 
 127. Gustavo Suárez Pertierra, La Laicidad en la Constitución Española, 53 PERSONA Y 
DERECHO 157, 163 (2005). 
 128. JOSÉ MARÍA GONZÁLEZ DEL VALLE, DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO ESPAÑOL 124–25 (4th ed. 
1997). 
 129. Id. at 125. 
 130. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has explained, 
[i]n a political legal system based on pluralism, ideological and religious freedom of 
individuals and non-confessionalism of the State, all public institutions and very 
especially educational institutions must be, in effect, ideologically neutral. This 
neutrality, which does not prevent the organization in public schools of optional classes 
to facilitate the right of parents to choose for their children a religious and moral 
education in accordance with their own convictions (art. 27.3 of the Constitution), is a 
necessary feature of each of the teaching positions offered at the school, and not the 
hypothetical result of casual coincidence in the institution and in relation to the students 
of teachers of different ideological orientations whose teachings mutually neutralize one 
another. 
S.T.C., Feb. 13, 1981 (No. 5) (Spain), http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/ 
doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=SENTENCIA-1981-0005. 
 131. GONZÁLEZ DEL VALLE, supra note 128, at 399–402. 
 132. For more on the positive (optional classes to facilitate the right of parents to an education 
in accordance with their own beliefs) and negative aspects (prohibition of indoctrination), see 
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specifying with a “positive” term what is “negatively” expressed with the 
concept of “indoctrination.” That is, the aim is to not indoctrinate.133 
In any case, there are also sectors of constitutional academic opinion 
that, considering a global analysis of the question—not focusing on a 
specific country, but covering in their reflections a wide range of 
European countries—view the terms neutrality, secularism, and laïcité as 
more or less equivalent expressions, also compatible in some cases with 
cooperation.134 At the same level of analysis, other sectors posit the 
establishment of secularist constitutionalism (laicïté), enforcing 
secularism as an objective or structural principle, as opposed to 
incomplete “conceptual representations” or metaphors such as 
“separation,” “convention or adaptation,” and, of course, “neutrality,”135 
which is criticized in terms of its actual operability. Indeed, for neutrality 
to conserve its appeal as “strict impartiality” on the part of the state, the 
state must determine the limits of public space and, once these are 
determined, religious activities falling outside this neutral sphere must be 
protected. The problem is the anachronistic nature of this operation, as 
the welfare state expands enormously the area of public space, making it 
extremely complex—or even unviable—to require strict neutrality in 
activities in which, both historically and today, religious groups act not 
as supporters of state welfare initiatives, but as agents of what they view 
as part of their specific mission. In this sense, it is illustrative to recall 
here the problems associated with implementation by the state of 
nondiscrimination in the provision of services (particularly at present in 
the United Kingdom),136 which ends up reducing the social presence of 
some religions in charity activities to a minimum. It seems, then, that the 
constitutional balance between religious autonomy and other values of 
ideologically liberal constitutionalism cannot be achieved simply by 
appealing to the neutrality of the state. “A neutrality mantle is ill-suited 
 
T     PRIETO A LVAREZ, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y ESPACIOS P  L    : LAICIDAD, PLURALISMO, 
S    L  , 190–91 (2010). 
 133. Ana Llano Torres, Unas Reflexiones Sobre la Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo en 
Relación con “Educación para la Ciudadanía,” en diálogo con Adela Cortina, 11 ANUARIO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 253, 258 (2010); Ana Llano Torres, El cansancio de Occidente, el nihilismo y 
el debate constitucional sobre el derecho a la educación: ¿de qué se trata?, ¿qué hace posible hoy 
una auténtica experiencia educativa?, 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 435, 489 (2004). 
 134. RENÁTA UITZ, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW 16–18 (2007).  
 135. Sajó, supra note 41, at 2403–14. 
 136. See Neil Addison, Catholic Care an Attack on the Idea of Charity Itself, RELIGION LAW 
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010, 3:18 PM), http://religionlaw.blogspot.com/2010/08/catholic-care-no-freedom-
for-charities.html.  
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to the task of balancing the relevant interests because both sides can—
and do—seize the mantle with equal force.”137 
It is more than likely that the sector of opinion referred to in the 
previous paragraph is advocating a strict, first-generation neutrality, a 
neutrality that jealously defends the state against the different versions of 
the good life of social actors, both religious and nonreligious. 
Nevertheless, this neutrality, over time, has ceased to be the unequivocal 
posture of the state.138 We are now clearly in another phase, which 
belongs, once again, to the “market of ideas and beliefs,” and which was 
analyzed by Joseph Weiler in his statement before the European Court of 
Human Rights. Weiler notes: 
If the social pallet of society were only composed of blue yellow and 
red groups, then black—the absence of color—would be a neutral 
color. But once one of the social forces in society has appropriated 
black as its color, then that choice is no longer neutral. Secularism does 
not favor a wall deprived of all State symbols. It is religious symbols 
which are anathema.139 
VI. NEUTRALITY AS A PRINCIPLE IN SPANISH LAW 
In view of the foregoing facts and reflections, it would be logical 
now to summarize the important points, identify the more outstanding 
critical elements, and propose some ideas about the possible role that the 
term “neutrality” may play in church-state law. 
As noted above, neutrality was originally used to refer to the activity 
or omission through which an individual refrains from intervening in or 
influencing a conflict between two or more other individuals.140 From 
the outset, this view does not fit easily with any situation involving 
religious activity in a society. Only in those cases where there is a 
religious conflict between two factions in the same country or the same 
society, as might have been the case in Germany, has the state—for 
historical reasons—kept its distance and declared itself neutral toward 
the conflicts between Christian churches. Of course, this was not the case 
in Spain, or in Italy, where the historical conflicts have been different, 
involving no more than the state and the Catholic Church (e.g., the 
 
 137. Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality”: A Non-
Neutral Critique, 84 OR. L. REV. 935, 944 (2005). 
 138. ANDRÉS OLLERO, ESPAÑA ¿UN ESTADO LAICO?: LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN 
PERSPECTIVA CONSTITUCIONAL 41–47 (2005). 
 139. Weiler, supra note 93. 
 140. See supra Parts II and III.  
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Italian State unification process, Spanish regalism, and the right of the 
Ecclesiastical Royal Patronage or Patronato regio, the anti-Catholic 
policy of the Second Spanish Republic, etc.). 
Neutrality in Spanish law is indifference or absence of judgment 
(either approval or reproach) only with regard to the dogmatic content of 
religious groups. But this type of neutrality is not precisely negative with 
regard to religion as a social phenomenon; it is more akin to indifference 
or nonrelation. In Spain, part of the multidimensional mandate of Article 
16 of the Constitution establishes that the public authorities must take 
into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society, within the scope of 
a fundamental right (although that fundamental right may not necessarily 
entail abstract consideration of religious beliefs in themselves141). It 
therefore might be appropriate to speak of positive neutrality as an 
expression of this principle or attitude in its application to the religious 
sphere. In this case, it is not indifference toward religions but the 
establishment of a certain type of relation and of political dialogue by 
virtue of a fundamental right. Neutrality thus understood justifies and 
supports the necessary adaptations of the law of the apparently neutral 
state in order to prevent unexpected infringements upon the free exercise 
of beliefs. 
The use of the qualifying terms “principle” or “attitude” with 
reference to state neutrality is intentional. In light of the foregoing 
reflections, it might be suggested that we are perhaps witnessing an 
emerging principle invoked to overcome, in part, the problems associated 
with the principle of laicidad discussed at the beginning of this paper. 
The response to this suggestion is not simple. On the one hand, neutrality 
as a principle is not entirely immune from the same confusion provoked 
by the principle of laicidad. Indeed, the preceding pages list multiple 
definitions for neutrality.142 On the other hand, if the focus of attention 
on academic opinion and case law is turned on beliefs in general, 
laicidad could turn into a refuge and an excuse that implicitly authorizes 
the State to remain neutral toward religions but with a certain myopia 
that prevents the detection, prevention, and condemnation of the 
assumption of power by nonreligious world views, a risk which is quite 
real and may already be happening. 
Along with negative and positive neutrality, this Article has also 
made reference above to neutrality of purpose (impartiality) and 
 
 141. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 116, at 190. 
 142. See supra Part V. 
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neutrality of outcome.143 These two dimensions or definitions of 
neutrality direct our attention to the facet of equality intrinsic to the idea 
of neutrality. Are both definitions applicable to religious neutrality? Of 
course, it is clear that neutrality of purpose lies at the heart of neutrality 
in its closest dimension to laicidad. And with regard to neutrality of 
outcome, as applied to the religious factor, it is necessary to make a 
distinction. Neutrality of outcome does apply in this context provided 
that its objective is the establishment of the conditions to ensure real 
enjoyment of religious freedom, removing the structural barriers of the 
apparently neutral legal system. Neutrality of outcome, however, would 
not be applicable to those actions that have the purpose of altering in any 
way the internal structure of religions, communities, or churches in a 
given society through measures of compensation that would directly 
affect demography, social profile, or societal acceptance, or that would 
constitute direct or indirect incentives of persuasion or dissuasion with 
regard to given beliefs. 
In this day and age, it would be difficult to argue that neutrality 
might come to constitute a guiding principle of Spanish church-law 
law—a kind of synthesis of the principles of equality and laicidad. 
Nevertheless, neutrality could ultimately prevail when considering the 
terminological evolution of the Spanish Constitutional Court. In effect, 
the court began by applying the category of non-confessionalism 
(aconfesionalidad) before moving to the use of laicidad and 
subsequently to laicidad positiva.144 Although neutrality appeared as a 
concept during these periods, it was still in incipient form, restricted to 
neutrality in public schools.145 However, in 1996 the Constitutional 
Court began to employ the specific term “religious neutrality,”146 
 
 143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 144. GUSTAVO SUÁREZ PERTIERRA, LAICIDAD Y COOPERACIÓN COMO BASES DEL MODELO 
ESPAÑOL: UN INTENTO DE INTERPRETACIÓN INTEGRAL (Y UNA NUEVA PLATAFORMA DE CONSENSO) 
26–28 (2010). 
 145. See ROBBERS, supra note 73, at 117–19. 
 146. The Court has explained this concept as follows: 
[A]rt. 16.3 CE, in stipulating that “no denomination shall have official status”, establishes 
a principle of neutrality of the public authorities in terms which, as stated in the S.T.C. 
24/1982 and 340/1993, “prohibits any kind of confusion between religious and State 
functions.” A direct consequence of this constitutional mandate is that citizens, in the 
exercise of their right to religious freedom, have as right “to act in this sphere with full 
immunity from action by the State” (S.T.C. 24/1982, Legal Grounds 1), the neutrality of 
which in religious affairs thus becomes a premise for peaceful coexistence between the 
different religious convictions existing in a plural and democratic society (art. 1.1 CE). 
S.T.C., Nov. 11, 1996 (No. 177) (Spain) http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/ 
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replacing the concept of laicidad, which nevertheless continues to 
coexist with it. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article began this study with reference to the term neutrality in 
three senses: myth, principle, and meaning. In reviewing the above 
reflections in light of the title of this work, in one sense, neutrality is a 
myth, because it proves impossible on various levels (a truly neutral state 
does not exist), or because it is significantly nuanced in order to adapt its 
appealing objective to the complexities of reality. Indeed, it is important 
that models constructed as castles in the air, grandiloquent and 
convincing in abstraction, do not jar with reality to the point that they 
produce results contrary to justice. Neutrality is at the same time a 
principle insofar as it expresses not only a guideline or a constant related 
to the legislation that regulates the fundamental freedoms (including 
religious freedom), but also because it expresses a directive and mandate 
consistent with the requirements of state action in managing legal 
contexts in which the religious factor is present. Finally, neutrality also 
points to a complex meaning, synthesizing elements related to 
nondiscrimination, the impartiality of public authorities, the separation 
between the state and religious beliefs, and even secularism or non-
confessionalism. 
Words wander and, like stones on the road, they also suffer the wear 
and erosion of use and time. On other occasions, the wear and tear is 
simply the result of manipulation. But we cannot renounce them—
neither words nor the meanings they carry—because the word is a divine 
gift. As the Spanish poet Blas de Otero reminds us, in the end, the word 
is all we have left: “If I lost my voice in the bush/ . . . If I have suffered 
thirst, hunger, all that was mine and proved to be nothing . . ./ if I opened 









 147. BLAS DE OTERO, En el Principio, in MEDIOBIOGRAFÍA: SELECCIÓN DE POEMAS 
BIOGRÁFICOS 71 (1997). 
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